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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 56 MARCH 1958 No. 5 
SHOULD THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
DISCARD ITS VEST?* 
Daniel M. Schuylerf-
I. INTRODUCTORY 
T HE venerable rule of property kno,vn as the rule against perpetuities has recently been subjected to numerous search-
ing and critical analyses, some of which will presently be dis-
cussed. Thus far nothing has been published dealing with, and 
only Professor Simes has touched upon,1 what seems to the present 
writer to be the most serious problem engendered by the common 
law rule in its commonly accepted form, i.e., the notion that the 
rule is concerned only with remoteness of vesting. It is the pur-
pose of the present discussion to examine the concept of vesting 
as related to the rule and to attempt to answer the question posed 
by the title of this article. To accomplish this objective it will 
be necessary first to advert to the history and purpose of the rule, 
to consider the application and consequences of violation of the 
rule in its present form and whether or not it performs a function 
in modern jurisprudence, and also to review the major criticisms 
which have thus far been launched against the rule. No attempt 
will be made to treat statutory substitutes which take the form 
of prohibitions against the "restraint of the absolute power of 
alienation"; what follows will be concerned with the common law 
rule and certain recent modifications of it. 
A. Statement, History and Purpose of the Rule 
Professor Gray's final pronouncement of the rule, that "No 
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest,"2 
•This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed. 
tMember of the Illinois and Wisconsin Bars; Professor of Law, Northwestern Univer-
sity.-Ed. 
l SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 67-68, 80-82 (1955). The author wishes 
to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Lewis M. Simes for his careful examination 
and analysis of the manuscript and for his ·helpful suggestions in connection therewith. 
2 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §201 (1942) (hereinafter cited as 
GRAY). 
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has of course become the rubric within which all future interests 
must fall in order to be valid. To the layman it would surely 
seem singular that a rule of high public policy, the very purpose 
of which is to devastate intention, should be couched in unin-
telligible abstractions. Indeed, the lawyer who remembers his 
law school struggles with "lives in being" and "vesting" may not 
view the rule very differently. Perhaps, however, the lawyer may 
find comfort in Holmes' epigram (uttered in another connection) 
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."3 For Gray's 
statement of the rule, with all of its infirmities, is probably as 
good a shorthand restatement as could be made of the patchwork 
of decisions extending over a period of more than two centuries, 
which, taken as a whole, constituted the common law's assess-
ment of where the line should be drawn as to the length of time 
that title-clogging future interests might remain extant. Thus, 
except in historical perspective, one may doubt that very much 
sense could be made of the rule against perpetuities-or for that 
matter of many rules of property. It is too much to expect that 
the ultimate composite of the judgments of a large number of 
judges of different eras and backgrounds, none of whom could 
be certain of his final objective, should be a model of logic. In 
fact, it ought to be a source of wonderment, and it is a very great 
tribute to the common law, that the rule against perpetuities is 
as logical as it is. 
Since the history of the rule-which is inseparably interwoven 
with its purpose-has been admirably outlined in Gray's trea-
tise,4 it need not long detain us here. It should, however, be 
observed that no rule against perpetuities would be necessary in 
a system of law which recognized no future interests. This is so 
because the rule is not a rule against restraints on the alienation 
of property. The rules against restraints on alienation are con-
cerned mostly with direct restraints; the rule against perpetuities 
deals with the indirect restraints created by future interests. It 
is not strange, therefore, that the rule against perpetuities did 
not take firm root until shortly after the decision in 1620 in 
Pells v. Brown5 where the indestructibility of the executory inter-
3 New York Trust Co. v. £isner, 256 U.S. 345 at 349 (1921) (federal estate tax of 1916 
held constitutional). 
4 GRAY, 126-176. 
5 Cro. Jae. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). Except for Smith v. Warren, Cro. Eliz. 688, 
78 Eng. Rep. 924 (1599), earlier cases appear to have held conditional limitations to be 
destructible. GRAY, §§142-147. 
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est seems first to have been unequivocally recognized. Destructible 
future interests had not offered the alluring and mischievous 
possibility of endless dead-hand control which the judges were 
quick enough to see lurking in the shadow of a future interest 
which could never be destroyed and which might, unless con-
tained, impair a title for a thousand years or even more. Nor is 
it strange that the judges who participated in the construction 
of the confining mechanism were unwilling to fix its limits at 
the beginning.6 Rather it is to their credit that they recognized 
the limits on their oracular capacities and took the matter step 
by step.7 
B. Application and Effect of the Rule 
Although the rule seems clearly to have been designed to 
further the marketability and development of real property and 
hence the economic welfare of an agrarian society,8 there is no 
doubt that it applies with equal force to legal interests in per-
sonalty.0 It applies also to equitable interests in real and personal 
6 The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681): "They 
will perhaps say, where will you stop, if not at Child and Bayly's Case? Answ. Where? 
why everywhere, where there is not any Inconvenience, any Danger of a Perpetuity; and 
whenever you stop at the Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee, there we will stop in the 
Limitation of a Term of Years ...• Now the Ultimum quod sit, or the utmost Limita-
tion of a Fee upon a Fee, is not yet plainly determined; but it will be soon found out, if 
Men shall set their Vvits on Work to contrive by Contingencies to do that, which the 
Law has so long laboured against; the Thing will make it self evident, where it is in-
convenient, and, God forbid, .but that Mischief should be obviated and prevented." 
Per Lord Chancellor Nottingham. 
7 In The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 at 36, 22 '.Eng. Rep. 931 (1681), Lord 
Chancellor Nottingham interpreted Wood v. Sanders, 1 Ch. 131, 22 Eng. Rep. 728 (1669), 
as holding that a contingency "wearing out in the Compass of two Lives in Being, the 
Remainder over ..• might well be limited upon it." See also Lloyd v. Carew, Show. 
Par!. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (1697). More lives were allowed in Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 
Salk. 229, 91 ·Eng. Rep. 203 (1699), and in Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. 
Rep. 1030 (1805), it was established that any number of lives reasonably capable of 
ascertainment could be selected. The 21-year period in gross was an outgrowth of the 
holding in Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. T. Talb. 228, 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (1736), where an 
interest which might not vest until the expiration of a life in being and the minority 
of .the taker was held good. In Cadell v. Palmer, 1 CI. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), 
it was held that a 21-year period in gross could be added to lives in being. 
8 6 .AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY 13-14 (1952) (hereinafter cited as AMERICAN I.Aw OF 
PROPERTY); CAREY AND SCHUYLER, !LLINOIS I.Aw OF FUTURE INTERESTS §475 (1941) (herein-
after cited as CAREY AND SCHUYLER); GRAY, §§119, 268; MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MORRIS AND LEACH); SIMES, PUBLIC 
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 33-40 (1955); SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
2d ed., §1212 (1956) (hereinafter cited as SIMES AND SMITH). 
9 GRAY, §§202, 323; MORRIS AND LEACH, 12; SIMES AND SMITH, §1235. 
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property even in instances where a trustee has an unrestricted 
power of sale, 10 and the argument has been forcefully put for-
ward that it should apply to the duration of trusts even though 
all outstanding interests are irrevocably vested.11 The acceptance 
of Gray's notions as to the scope of the rule, however, would 
preclude its _ application to the duration of trusts per se and 
would require the conclusion that a trust could last forever if 
all of the future interests created by it were certain to vest with-
in the limits of time.12 But even Gray and his disciple, Professor 
Kales, were dissatisfied with this view and suggested that some 
rule akin to the rule against perpetuities should apply to the 
postponement of the enjoyment of vested equitable future in-
terests.13 As to this point, no clear-cut rule of decision exists14 
and scholars are not in agreement,15 so it remains a hazy area 
in a field of law with respect to which long years of trial and 
error have developed a good deal of certainty concerning many 
of its other phases. 
Without attempting to be exhaustive, but speaking with 
greater particularity, the ru1e applies, where future interests are 
remote, to contingent executory interests and to contingent re-
mainders, at least where these are rendered indestructible by 
protective legislation.16 As a result, the rule is of course appli-
cable to contingent class gifts and in this connection it is im-
portant to note that, in its orthodox sense, the rule demands not 
only that a class gift vest within the prescribed period but also 
that the precise shares of each member of the class be determined 
within that time.17 It applies also to options in gross to purchase 
property, 18 to the creation and exercise of powers of appointment19 
10 GRAY, §269; SIMES AND SMITH, §1249. 
11 SIMES AND SMITH, c. 40. And see MORRIS AND LEACH, 311-316. 
12 GRAY, §412. And see id., §§232-246. 
13 Id., §§121.1 to 121.8; KALES, FuruRE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§658-661, 677, 681, 732-741 
(1920). 
14 SIMES AND SMITH, §1393 at 245-247. And see CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§478, 480; id., 
1954 Supp., §§478, 480. · 
15 SIMES AND SMITH, §1391, n. 2. 
16Executory interests: GRAY, §§160-164; SIMES AND SMITH, §1238. Contingent Remain-
ders: CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §496; GRAY, §§284-286; MORRIS AND LEACH, 197-203; SIMES 
AND SMITH, §1237. 
17 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.26; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §497; GRAY, §§369-
875; MORRIS AND LEACH, 95-96, 118-125; SIMES AND SMITH, §1265. 
18 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; GRAY, §§275• 
275.1; MORRIS AND LEACH, 213-215; SIMES AND SMITH, §1244. 
19 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§24.32-24.33; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §483; GRAY, 
§§510-540; MORRIS AND LEACH, 131-150; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1271-1276. 
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and in England and perhaps in some American states to fiduciary 
powers.20 It even applies to charitable gifts which may not take 
effect until too remote a time except in cases where the remote 
gift follows a valid prior gift to charity.21 
Since the rule is supposed to be concerned only with remote-
ness of vesting, it has no application to reversions or vested re-
mainders,22 nor indeed to those executory interests which, at least 
for convenience, may for the moment be referred to as "vested."23 
Rights of entry,24 possibilities of reverter,25 resulting trust in-
terests26 and options appendant to long term leases,27 however 
remote, have not generally been regarded in this country28 as 
subject to the rule. 
The non-application of the rule to the contingent future in-
terests to which reference is made in the last sentence of the 
preceding paragraph seriously undermines the logic of the concept 
of the rule as one which is applicable to remote contingent in-
terests and inapplicable to vested interests. That this is not the 
only illogical aspect of the rule will be more particularly shown 
when the requirement of absolute certainty of vesting is dis-
cussed. For the moment it is sufficient to recall that the rule in-
sists that in testing the validity of a future interest we must deter-
mine whether, at the time the interest was created, there was 
any possibility, however remote, that the interest might not 
vest within the limits of time.29 If, according to this test, a future 
interest is found to violate the rule, absolute invalidity is the 
consequence, no matter how devastating this may be to the inten-
20 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROP£RTY, §24.63; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §484; GRAY, §§487-
509.19; MORRIS AND LEACH, 225-235; SilllES AND Sl\lITH, §1277. 
216 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.38-24.40; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §491; GRAY, 
§§589-607; MORRIS AND LEACH, 179-188; SilllES AND SlllITH, §§1278-1287. 
22 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.19; GRAY, §205; SIMES AND SlllITH, §1235. 
23 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.20; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §480; SIMES AND 
Sl\lITH, §1236. 
24 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62; CAREY AND SCHULER, §493; GRAY, §§304-310; 
MORRIS AND LEACH, 205-206; SIMES AND SlllITH, §1238. 
25 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §493; GRAY, §313; 
MORRIS AND LEACH, 205-206; SIMES AND SMITH, §1239. 
26 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §495; GRAY, §327.1; S!l\lES AND SMITH, §1240. 
27 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.57; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; GRAY, §230.3; 
SilllES AND SMITH, §1244. 
28 In England rights of entry are subject to the rule. MORRIS AND !.EACH, 205. So are 
possibilities of reverter but according to only one case. Hopper v. Corporation of Liver-
pool, 88 S.J. 213 (1944). The English cases also hold that an option given a tenant for 
years to purchase the fee is bad if exercisable at too remote a time. GRAY, §230.3, n. I. 
29 6 AlllERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.21; GRAY, §214; MORRIS AND LEACH, 68-89; SIMES 
AND SMITH, §1228. 
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tion of the maker of the instrument of gift.30 Moreover, in some 
jurisdictions at least, if the invalid attempt to create a future 
interest is regarded as inseparably interwoven with prior and 
otherwise valid gifts, these too will be void.31 Thus the rule is not 
only illogical in some of its applications and non-applications, 
but it is also characterized by extreme harshness when it is 
transgressed. 
C. Does.the Rule Perform a Modern Function? 
Even the briefest consideration of the original purpose and 
development of the rule and of its present day form and applica-
tion is enough to induce the conclusion that a program to 
modernize the common law rule against perpetuities may well 
be apropos. Certainly there is virtually automatic justification 
for reappraisal of any rule of law which had its origin almost 
three and a half centuries ago in a totally different social order. 
And, if that were not enough, the peculiarities of old age that 
have come to characterize the rule, its stringent and relentless 
effects, its unnecessarily punitive qualities, and, above all in the 
opinion of the writer, the notion that the mortal results of its 
application or non-application should be made to depend upon 
the occult concept of vesting-all of these factors-combine to 
signalize the worth of probing deeply in search of possible im-
provements. But one should first be satisfied that some rule 
against perpetuities has modern utility. For, if there is no present 
need to limit the time when future interests vest in possession 
or otherwise, then the rule should simply be abolished. 
Of course, no responsible person would advocate that an 
ancient common law rule of property should be summarily 
jettisoned, but it by no means follows from the mere age of a 
rule that its non-retroactive abandonment will be attended with 
undue disturbance. Illustrative of this is the abrogation in Eng-
land and in many American jurisdictions, after careful considera-
tion, of the rule in Shelley's Case32 and the rule of destructibility 
of contingent remainders.33 In neither instance have any untoward 
30 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.44; GRAY, §§629-631; MORRIS AND LEACH, 239-
242; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1288-1290. 
316 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.48-24.52; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§180-181; 
GRAY, §§247-249.9; MORRIS AND LEACH, 162-165; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1262-1264. 
32 SIMES AND SMITH, §§1563-1568. 
33 Id., §§207-208. 
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consequences been apparent. Experience would thus justify the 
abolition of the rule against perpetuities if one could honestly 
conclude that there is no present need to limit the time when 
future interests should vest in possession or otherwise. This prob-
lem has received distinguished attention,34 but no one has yet 
suggested that no rule against perpetuities should be retained. 
Indeed, although Professor Simes declines to accept the conven-
tional rationalizations of the rule, his thoughtful and thorough-
going treatment of this subject35 closes with a defense of some 
rule against perpetuities which is unlikely to be pierced in the 
foreseeable future. It would of course be superfluous to review 
his arguments in detail here, but it will serve a purpose to 
summarize them briefly and to offer a few comments concerning 
them. 
Professor Simes first analyzes the rule against perpetuities in 
terms of its original purpose, i.e., as Gray put it, "forwarding the 
circulation of property which it is its policy to promote."36 Profes-
sor Simes concludes that the essence of the rationale of the rule, 
as advanced in the English cases and by such eminent authorities 
as Jarman, Lewis and Gray, is this: "The Rule against Perpetuities 
furthers alienability; if it were not for this Rule, property would 
be unproductive and society would have less income."37 But this 
is no longer true, Professor Simes argues, for modern dispositions 
of substantial wealth are for the most part dispositions of securi-
ties in trust. And even if the trustee does not have an unrestricted 
power of sale according to the trust instrument or by statute, 
equity can permit the sale of trusteed property which has become 
unproductive. Moreover, quite apart from this doctrine, where 
corporate shares or bonds are held in trust, property owned by 
the corporation is freely alienable. Professor Simes also shows 
that English legislation (which could be adopted in American 
jurisdictions in lieu of a rule against perpetuities) has in effect 
abolished legal future interests and made all future interests 
equitable, at the same time allowing only two legal estates in 
land, the fee simple absolute and the term for years. If a "trust 
for sale," pursuant to which trustees are required to sell realty 
84 Fraser, "The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 MINN. L. REY. 560 
(1922); MORRIS AND LEACH, 13-18; SIMES, PUBUC POUCY AND THE DEAD HAND 32-71 (1955). 
85 Id. at 40-63. 
86 GRAY, §2.1. 
37 SIMES, PUBUC Poucy AND THE DEAD HAND 36 (1955). 
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is not created, a "settlement" is, and where there is a settlement, 
"there is always some person, usually the life tenant, who has 
power to sell in fee simple."38 The proceeds will be held in trust 
for the benefit of those who were originally given an interest 
in the property in question. Professor Simes concludes that, "In 
England, when property is affected by a future interest, there is, 
in nearly all cases, some person who can sell absolutely or in fee 
simple."39 Accordingly, if the policy of the rule against perpe-
tuities is merely to further alienability, that policy is satisfied 
by the English legislation just described and can be as well satis-
fied by like legislation in any jurisdiction which recognizes future 
interests. In addition, Professor Simes points to the expanding 
concepts of the power of eminent domain, especially as illus-
trated by the English Town and Country Planning Act of 1947,40 
which seems to permit anyone interested in acquiring property 
for more productive use to do so where the intended use is prac-
ticable and approved as a part of a development plan. In such 
a case land can be acquired by a governmental board and turned 
over to the individual who proposes to improve it. Kindred legis-
lation exists also in this country41 and, since it relies for its im-
plementation on the power of eminent domain, it has an over-
bearing effect on outstanding future interests and hence tends 
to minimize the need for a rule against perpetuities as a means of 
confining the clogging effect of future interests. 
A second rationalization which has been advanced in favor 
of a modern rule against perpetuities is the notion that such 
a rule tends to prevent undue private concentrations of wealth. 
Professor Simes rejects this as a justification for the rule since he 
feels that, "undue concentration of wealth is an evil which can 
best be combatted by tax legislation, rather than by perpetuity 
rules."42 
Finally, it has been suggested that, "limitations unalterably 
effective over a long period of time would hamper the normal 
381d. at 45. 
39 Id. at 46. 
40 10 &: 11 Geo. 6, c. 51 (1947), discussed by SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 
48:52 (1955). Sec especially Hanily v. Minister of Local Government & Planning, [1952] 
2 Q. B. 444. 
41 See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 67½, §§63-91 (Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act); 
65 N.Y. Laws (McKinney Unconsol. 1949) tit. 11, §3301 et seq. (Urban Redevelopment 
Corporations Law). 
42 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 57 (1955). 
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operation of the competitive struggle."43 In other words, in 
the absence of any rule against. perpetuities, natural selection re-
sulting from survival of the fittest, would be jeopardized. This 
Professor Simes also dismisses as a valid vindication of the rule. 
If it is unsound to permit the unfit to be protected for many 
generations, then why shelter even one generation? Moreover, 
the idea that the weak should be weeded out in the economic 
struggle is inconsonant with the "elaborate welfare machinery'' 
afforded by modem society which is "not organized on a theory 
of survival of the fittest, but of survival of the weak."H 
Despite the foregoing, Professor Simes concludes that there 
is a true basis for a rule against perpetuities in that, "It is socially 
desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living 
· members and not by the dead."45 In furtherance of this position 
he points to the tendency toward stagnation which would result 
from perpetual dead-hand control, if only in the limitations which 
this would place upon the venturing of risk capital and indeed 
upon the expenditure of capital for consumer goods, which, under 
certain circumstances, may be very desirable from a social point 
of view. Finally, the dead hand could, through the mechanism of 
shifting interests, impose standards of conduct on beneficiaries for 
generations to come if there were no limit upon the time when 
future interests could take effect. 
As to dispositions in trust one may agree with Professor Simes 
that the rule against perpetuities cannot be rationalized today in 
terms of furthering alienability when the trustee has an express 
power of sale. Likewise, in non-trust gifts, it is true that legisla-
tion, similar to the English legislation described above and insur-
ing the existence in some person of a power to convey land free 
of future interests, would eliminate the need for a rule against 
perpetuities concerned solely with the marketability of real estate. 
But not all trusts contain powers of sale and many American 
states do not have statutes creating fiduciary powers of sale as 
a matter of law. Nor do courts of equity freely direct the sale of 
trust property where no such power exists46 and even if they did 
the encumbrance created by the necessity of resort to the judicial 
process is not lightly to be ignored. Furthermore, it is not 
43 4 PROPERTY RE'srATEMENT 2132 (1944). 
44 SIMES, PUBUC PouCY AND THE DEAD HAND 58 (1955). 
451d. at 59. 
46 2 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§167, 190.4 (1956). 
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likely that many American legislatures could readily be in-
duced to go as far as the British Parliament did in limiting 
the freedom of settlors and testators to impose, upon property 
dispositions; restrictions in the form of future interests which 
have long been recognized.47 And certainly, in the area of public 
control of property, most American states are not yet prepared 
to go as far as the British did in the English Town and Country 
Planning Act of 194 7. One may therefore differ with Professor 
Simes' statement that, "if . . . alienability to secure productivity 
is the sole purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities, then we have 
reached a point where the Rule should be completely abolished."48 
Of course, on the assumption that substitutionary legislation of 
the type described would be adopted, one would be less inclined 
to quarrel with this position. But before this can come to pass 
a great deal of legislative inertia must be overcome; meanwhile 
the rule still seems to serve some of its original purpose. 
Whether a rule against perpetuities is warranted for the more 
metaphysical reason that, somewhat like the Sherman Act, it 
furthers a healthy competition is obviously open to debate. As 
opposed to Professor Simes' expressed reasons for disbelief in 
this as a ground for retention of the rule, it can be argued that 
although the desire to protect one's immediate family should be 
sanctioned as an incentive to productivity, this must be balanced 
against the undesirability of cloaking generation after generation 
of weaklings with the security of a great fortune. This is not, as 
Professor Simes argues, inconsistent with present day "welfare" 
thinking, for the proponents of security want security for all-
not just for a select few. So it is not entirely illogical to urge 
that even in a welfare state the rule against perpetuities performs 
the societal function of striking a fair balance between what 
Professor Leach has called the "dynastic impulses" of the very 
wealthy and a reasonable and commonly shared aspiration that 
children and grandchildren be spared some of the struggle under-
gone by their ancestors. However, whatever one's conclusion in 
this regard may be, there is much to be said for Professor Simes' 
view that this balance should be maintained through the taxing 
process and not by a rule of property. ' 
47 In addition to the Town and Country Planning Act, note 40 supra, see the Law 
of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20 (1925), the Settled Land Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 18 (1925) and 
the Trustee Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 19 (1925), all discussed in SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
DEAD HAND 44-51 (1955). 
48Id. at 53. 
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With Professor Simes' judgment that too much control of 
the living by the dead is undesirable and that the rule against 
perpetuities is desirable because it tends to prevent the dead hand 
from reaching too far into the future, no sensible person could 
disagree. The analogy that he draws between testamentary re-
strictions and "special legislation, written by the dead hand, ap-
plicable only to particular persons and property, and as unchang-
ing as the ancient laws of the Medes and Persians,''49 is persuasive. 
So is his argument that, by restricting the dead hand, the rule 
tends to free risk capital, which is a necessity unless our basic 
economic concepts are to be abandoned. Acceptance of this point 
of view leads at once to agreement with Professor Simes' broader 
conclusion that some rule against perpetuities is needed. More 
especially is this true if one believes, as has been suggested above, 
that the rule still performs a function in furthering the alien-
ability of property and that it perhaps serves at least some role 
in promoting competition. If these things are so, our attention 
may appropriately be directed toward seeking to adapt the rule 
to its modern setting. 
IL CRITICISMS OF THE RULE AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 
Most of the major criticisms which have been directed at the 
rule against perpetuities are interrelated. It is therefore virtually 
impossible, as will be apparent from the discussion which follows, 
completely to separate one indictment from another. However, 
in the interest of clarity, an effort will be made to categorize, 
so far as possible, and to illustrate in concrete terms the reason 
for, the scholarly assaults which have been made upon the rule 
during the past several years. Reforms which have been suggested 
will then be considered in conjunction with examples of the 
evils they are designed to cure. Finally, an attempt to weigh the 
efficacy and practicability of these suggestions will be made before 
specific treatment of the problems created by the rule's concern 
with remoteness of vesting is undertaken. 
A. The Rule Is Illogical and Harsh 
I. In the Period Which It Specifies. As it finally crystallized, 
the rule against perpetuities requires that future interests must 
vest within lives in being and 21 years from the date of their 
creation. Any number of measuring lives having no relationship 
49Id. at 88. 
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to the dispositions in the instrument of gift50 may be selected, 
provided that they and the time when they come to an end are 
reasonably capable of ascertainment.51 The 21-year period may be 
a period in gross unrelated to any measuring lives or to the 
minorities of any potential takers. 52 A child who is conceived is 
a life in being for purposes of the rule and therefore the period 
or periods53 of gestation of a c_hild or children en ventre is often 
in a sense added to the period of the rule, but a period of nine 
months in gross may not be added. 54 
Considering the length of time that the judicial process took 
to settle upon the period of the rule,°5 it is questionable whether 
any clear-cut statement of the reasons for the period ultimately 
decided upon can be regarded as much more than an ex post 
facto rationalization. It is said, however, that lives in being and 
21 years was selected as the prescribed period because the rule 
was designed to control unreasonable family settlements and it 
is reasonable that one disposing of property should be able to 
provide for all of the members of his family whom he knew, and 
for their children during their minorities. 56 Whether or not this 
is a retrospective appraisal it makes good sense, and it has afforded 
the springboard for suggestions that the period of the rule should 
in some respects be modified. 
Although no severe attacks have been made upon the period 
of the rule as it affects family dispositions, some proposals for 
change have been made. In the light of the rationale that a 
testator should be able to make provision for those whom he 
knew, it has been suggested that the difficulty of ascertaining and 
tracing large numbers of unrelated lives may call for some further 
restriction on the number of measuring.Jives that may be select-
ed.57 It has also been suggested that draftsmen could be more 
r;o Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805). 
51 Re Villar, [1929) 1 Ch. 243 (all the lineal descendants of Queen Victoria living 
at testator's death). Compare Re Leverhulme, [1943] 2 All E. R. 274 at 280-281: "As a 
result of my decision the clause in question can still be validly employed in the case of 
a testator dying in 1925; but I do not at all encourage anyone to use the formula in the 
case of a testator who dies in the year 1943 or at any later date." Per -Morton, J. 
52 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). 
53 GRAY, §§220-222. 
54 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372 at 421, 422, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). GRAY, §222. 
55 The rule's development extended over upwards of 200 years from the decision in 
Ohild v. Baylie, Cro. Jae. 459, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618), and perhaps prior thereto (GRAY, 
§§153-154) to Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). 
56 MORRIS AND I.EACH, 65. 
57 Id. at 66-67. 
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certain of achieving their clients' objectives if, as an alternative 
to lives in being and 21 years, they were permitted to choose a 
period in gross of as long as 80 years.58 Finally, the view has 
been advanced that the 21-year period in gross (which Gray 
thought should never have been extended beyond minorities50) 
is too short, the theory being that if one should be permitted to 
provide for his grandchildren he should be able to keep capital 
out of their hands for a longer time than lives in being and the 
21-year period in gross may permit. 60 
As to non-family dispositions, uniformity in recommendations 
for reform has been lacking insofar as time limitations are con-
cerned. As appears later in more detail, the exemption from the 
rule of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry (which are 
seldom employed in family settlements) is quite generally thought 
to be unjustified.61 Opinion varies, however, as to the extent 
to which these interests should be subjected to temporal restric-
tions. Apparently some proponents of reform feel that lives in · 
being and 21 years, at least as an alternative period, would afford 
an apt time limitation, 62 despite the fact that a possibility of 
reverter or a right of entry is almost never established for the 
purpose of providing for children and more remote issue of the 
creator of the interest. With respect to options in gross ( as dis-
tinguished from options appendant to leases which most commen-
tators seem to feel should not be restricted63), proponents of re-
form would apparently agree that lives in being are inappropriate 
as a measure of validity, for lives in being would almost always be 
irrelevant and would constitute an artificial intrusion upon a 
purely commercial transaction.64 But there is disagreement as 
to whether options in gross should be limited in time at all and 
if so to what degree. 65 
58Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report, Cmd. 18, at 7, 30 (1956) (hereinafter 
cited as Law Reform Committee Report). 
59 GRAY, §§186-188. 
60 MORRIS AND LEACH, 67-68; SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 68-69 (1955). 
61 Law Reform Committee Report 20-21, 32; MORRIS AND LEACH, 207-211; SIMES, 
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 70-71, 79-80 (1955). 
62 Law Reform Committee Report 20; MoRRis AND LEACH, 207; Leach, "Perpetuities 
Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. REV. 1349 at 1354-1355, 1362-1365 (1954). 
63 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.57; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; Law Reform 
Committee Report 19, 32; MORRIS AND LEACH, 218; SIMES AND SMITH, §1244, p. 162. But 
see GRAY, §230.3. 
6i 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56, p. 142; GRAY, §330.3, pp. 367-368, n. 2; 
Law Reform Committee Report 19-20, 32; MoRRis AND LEAcH, 217. 
115 Pro: CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; GRAY, §§330 to 330.3; Law Reform Committee 
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2. In Its Requirement of Absolute Certainty of Vesting. As 
is well known, the rule against perpetuities is a pessimist or an 
optimist depending upon one's point of view. That is but another 
way of expressing the rule's requirement that future interests 
to which it applies must be absolutely certain, at the time of their 
creation, to vest within the prescribed limits of time. It is not 
enough that a future interest might or even almost surely would 
do so; if it was not sure to do so, the interest is bad and indeed 
was void from its inception. This extraordinarily despairing ap-
proach not only invalidates many interests which, if permitted 
to stand, would have vested within the period of the rule, but 
it also complicates the mathematical aspects of the rule since 
one must exhaust all possible assumptions as to births, deaths, 
and often the happening of other events, to be sure one has done 
one's sums correctly.66 This aspect of the rule, which necessitates 
( often in retrospect) assumptions of the most improbable possibili-
ties, has generated some fantastic decisions. These in tum have 
been responsible for Professor Leach's very articulate invectives,67 
presently to be discussed, against the present rule. 
The rigors of the requirement of absolute certainty of vesting 
cannot, in theory at least, be mitigated through the interpretative 
process; the formula is that you construe the instrument of gift 
as though there were no rule against perpetuities. Having thus 
construed the instrument, you then apply the rule and it is 
simply unfortunate if its inexorable mathematics destroy the 
dispositions intended. 68 In other words, the rule is a rule of 
Report 19-20, 32 (21-year period recommended). Con: 6 .AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§24.56, pp. 142, 143-145 ("neither lives in being nor a period of twenty-one years, nor 
both together, have any significance •.. "); Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending 
the Rule's Reign of Terror,'' 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 at 736-739, 748 (1952); MORRIS AND 
LEACH, 220. 
66 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.21; GRAY, §214; Leach, "Perpetuities in Per-
spective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 at 728-734 (1952); 
MORRIS AND LEACH, 68-69; SIMES AND SMITH, §1228. 
67 Leach: "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARv. L. R.Ev. 
1329 (1938); "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents," 68 L. Q. R.Ev. 35 (1952); 
"Perpetuities in Perspective: 'Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 
(1952); "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 (1954); 
"An Act Modifying and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities," 39 MASS. L. Q. (No. 3) 
15 (1954). 
68 See, e.g., Pearks v. Mosely, 5 App. Cas. 714 at 719 (1880): "You do not import the 
law of remoteness into the construction of the instrument, -by which you investigate the 
expressed intention of the testator. You take his words, and endeavour 10 arrive at their 
meaning, exactly in the same manner as if there had been no such law •••• " Per Lord 
Selbome. 
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property and applies irrespective of intention. That only a whim-
sical grantor or testator would knowingly make a void gift is 
supposedly of no consequence. Fortunately for many testators 
(or, more accurately, the intended objects of their bounty), courts 
frequently, if tacitly, ignore this harsh precept.69 
The foregoing may be best understood when illustrated in 
concrete terms. Thus, suppose that T by his will gives property 
in trust to pay the income to A for life, and at his death to dis-
tribute the corpus of the trust to the eldest son of A, living at A's 
death, who becomes a college graduate.70 A will have an equitable 
life estate if he is alive at T's death and an attempt will have been 
made to create an equitable future interest in his eldest son who 
survives him and has graduated or does graduate from college. 
This, however, is invalid even though when T dies A has ten 
sons who are all college graduates and even though all of them 
survive A. The requirement of absolute certainty of vesting de-
mands that we assume (no matter if the validity of the interest 
is not litigated until after A's death) that all of A's sons might 
have predeceased him; that he might have had another or more 
sons; that one or more of these hypothetical afterborns might" 
have survived A; and that the eldest of these might not have grad-
uated from college until more than 21 years after the death of A 
who was a life in being at T's death. Thus the rule is violated, 
on the basis of hypothetical suppositions, by a future interest 
which, if allowed to stand, would have vested at A's death-21 
years short of the period permitted by the rule. The gift could 
have been saved, of course, had the draftsman referred to "the 
eldest son of A who is living at T's death and who survives A," for 
then whoever took the gift would have been a life in being at 
T's death. But that was not done, and, under orthodox views 
of the rule, the italicized words cannot be added or implied by 
construction. 
Another illustration of the requirement of absolute certainty 
of vesting is to be found in the so-called "unborn widow" cases. 
Suppose a testamentary gift by T to A for life, remainder to 
his widow for life, remainder to such of A's children as are living 
at the death of the widow. T has always been fond of A's wife, 
69 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.45; CAREY AND SCHuYLER, §508; GRAY, §633; 
MORRIS AND LEACH, 242-245; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1288-1290. 
70 Cf. Abbiss v. ;Burney, 17 Ch. Div. 211 (1881), where the gift over was "unto such 
son of William MacDonald, Archdeacon of Wilts, as should first attain the age of twenty-
five years. • • ." 
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W, who is alive when T makes his will and who also survives T. 
A is 65 when T dies; Wis 63. A and W have four children rang-
ing in age from 32 to 40. A predeceases W who later dies leav-
ing the four children surviving her. Thus, if allowed to take 
the property willed to them, the children would take 21 years 
before the expiration of the period of the rule because A and W 
were both lives in being at T's death. The ulterior gift to the 
children is nevertheless void.71 The rule requires the assumption 
that W might predecease A, that A might marry a woman un-
born at T's death, that she might have children by A and that 
she might live for more than 21 years after the death of the last 
to die of A and all of his children by W. A's children by his 
second marriage would then be the ultimate takers and, since the 
gift to A's children was to such of them "as are living at the death" 
of his widow, their "interests" would not have vested within the 
period of the rule. These assumptions present the rule in one 
of its most illogical aspects, for under the facts supposed it is 
clear indeed that when T referred to A's "widow" he meant W 
who was a life in being. If the draftsman had said that, or if 
a court so interpreted the will, the gift over to the children would 
be good. 
Proponents of reform argue that since proper draftsmanship 
would have prevented both of the gifts above supposed from 
being destroyed, the rule is illogical in striking down a future 
limitation which, had it not been invalid, would in fact have 
vested well within the limits of time.72 This being so, the argu-
ment runs, the spirit of the rule is not violated. The rule is thus 
too harsh since it visits "venial faults with oppressive retribu-
tion."73 
3. In Accepting Fantastic Hypotheses. Closely related to the 
716 Al\!ERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.21; GRAY, §214; MORRIS AND LEACH, 70-71; 
SIMES AND SMITH, §1228 at 119-120. 
72 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.21 to 24.23; Law Reform Committee Report 
8-9, 10-12, 15-16; MORRIS AND LEACH, 73-74, 79-81, 83-89. See also, in addition to Professor 
Leach's articles, cited note 67 supra, the following: notes, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1174 (1947); 
97 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 263 (1948); Bregy, "A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Per-
petuities," 23 TEMP. L. Q. 313 (1950); Newhall, "Doctrine of the 'Second Look,'" 92 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 13 (1953); Tudor, "Absolute Certainty of Vesting under the Rule 
Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic," 34 BOST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 129 (1954); Cohan, 
"The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels from Old Nutshells," 
28 TEMP. L. Q. 321 (1955); Bogert, "Public Policy and the Dead Hand: A Special Book 
Review," 6 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 51 (1956). 
73 Per Cardozo, J., in Jacob&: Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 at 242, 129 N.E. 889 
(1921), a contract case holding that the contractor would not be denied recovery because 
of an insignificant deviation from specifications. 
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rule's requirement of absolute certainty of vesting is its acceptance 
of fantastic hypotheses, both prospectively and retroactively. Some 
of the most notorious of these owe their notoriety to Professor 
Leach's picturesque and playful sobriquets. Those which appear 
to have piqued him the most74 and which are particularly spec-
tacular are the rule's assumptions that: (1) a man or woman, re-
gardless of age or physical condition, is capable of fathering 
or bearing children (the "Fertile Octogenarian"); (2) that a child, 
however young, is capable of procreation (the "Precocious Tod-
dler"); and (3) that a will may be probated or some other event 
may occur more than 21 years after a testator's death (the "Magic 
Gravel Pit"). 
The doctrine of the fertile octogenarian may be illustrated 
by assuming the same facts which were supposed in the preceding 
subdivision, i.e., that T creates a testamentary trust to pay the 
income to A for life and at his death to pay over the corpus to 
the eldest son of A, living at A's death, who becomes a col-
lege graduate. We have seen that the ultimate gift is void even 
though at T's death A has ten sons who have already graduated 
from college. We have also seen that if no son of A born after 
T's death could take, the ultimate gift would be good. Let us 
now suppose that A is T's daughter and that she is 65 years old 
when T dies. Obviously she can have no more children so any-
one who lives to answer the description of a taker of the ultimate 
gift is bound to be one of A's ten sons who were living at T's 
death. Hence the ultimate gift is bound to vest within the period 
of the rule. But it is invalid nonetheless, for the rule against 
perpetuities presumes that A is capable of having more children75 
and once this assumption is made all of the other assumptions 
made in the preceding subdivision come into play and with 
nuclear vigor operate to destroy the future interest. 
The precocious toddler requires a little more imagination 
but he may be conjured up. In Re Gaite's Will Trusts,16 T 
had made a testamentary gift of income to A for life and following 
that a gift of principal to "such of her grandchildren living at my 
death or born within five years therefrom who shall attain the 
age of 21 years .... " At T's death, A was 65 and had two living 
74' Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 721 at 731-734 (1952). 
75 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787). 
76 [1949] 1 All E. R. 459. 
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children and one grandchild. Only by supposing that A might 
remarry, that she might have another child and that that child 
might have a child within five years from T's death, could the 
gift to T's grandchildren be invalid. That would mean that a 
child under five would have to be presumed capable of producing 
an offspring. Although the ~court held the gift to the grand-
children good, it reached that result on the footing that a mar-
riage of the hypothetical precocious toddler under the age of 
16 would have been void under English Law.77 It would certainly 
have been more sensible to say that the suppositions infant could 
not have had a child within five years from T's death and that 
therefore any grandchildren who answered the description of 
takers must do so, if _at all, within the period of the rule. 
The exhaustion of the magic gravel pits was the event upon 
which, in Re Wood,78 the testator's issue, living upon the hap-
pening of that event, were to take. The gravel pits were in fact 
exhausted within six years after the testator's death, but the 
gift to his issue was held void because the gravel pits might have 
lasted more than 21 years. Gifts to take effect upon the happening 
of so-called "administrative" or other more common contingen-
cies, e.g., the probate of a will, 79 the payment of debts80 or the 
ending of the war81 are equally offensive to the rule despite the 
extreme unlikelihood of any such event occurring beyond the 
prescribed limits of time .. Again they could be saved by proper 
draftsmanship, or by temperate judicial construction. But drafts-
men continue to be fallible and the attitude of courts toward 
their foibles continues to be something less than benevolent. 
From the foregoing examples it must be apparent that the 
extreme hypotheses prerequisite to the results reached are but an 
extension of the requirement of absolute certainty of vesting. 
77 This aspect of the case is criticized in Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending 
the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 at 733-734 (1952). But compare Morris, 
"Rule Against Perpetuities and Age of Marriage," 13 CoNv. 289 (1949); Momus AND 
LEACH, 82-83. 
78 [1894] 3 Ch. 381. 
79 Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Ill. 45, 
170 N.E. 699 (1930). But see Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893). And com-
pare Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §153a, altering this rule in Illinois. 
80 GRAY, §§415-416. And see Hodam v. Jordan, (E.D. Ill. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 183. 
81 But in Monarski v. Greb, 407 Ill. 281, 95 N.E. (2d) 433 (1950), a charitable gift 
contingent upon -the inability to locate certain enemy aliens or to pay legacies to them 
within "three years after the Armistice of War II •.• " was held valid on the surprising 
ground that the contingency :was "certain to all sane persons to occur well within ••• 
the period limited •by the rule against perpetuities." 
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Consequently, the arguments of proponents of reform directed 
against the fantastic suppositions in which the rule at times re-
quires one to indulge are much the same as those put forward 
in opposition to the requirement of certainty. However, as to 
cases such as those discussed in this subdivision, it is in addition 
argued with a good deal of reason that a conclusive presumption 
of fertility or a presumption that an administrative contingency 
will not occur within the period of the rule is an affront to com-
mon sense and hence a serious reflection on a system of law which 
is supposed to be logical. 
4. In Its Application to Class Gifts. As before stated the 
rule against perpetuities is even more stringent as applied to 
class gifts than it is in its application to gifts to individuals. 
When a gift is to a class the entire interest given must of course 
be certain to vest within the period of the rule. But, more than 
that, if the gift is void as to any member of the class the entire 
gift will be held to be bad.82 A typical case is a testamentary 
gift to A for life followed by a gift over to such of his children 
as attain 25.83 Even if one of A's children has reached 25 at the 
testator's death and has thus attained a vested interest, the gift 
to the children of A fails. According to the usual rules as to the 
closing of classes the class remains open until A dies. Meanwhile 
he may have more children and one or more of them may not 
reach 25 and thus attain a vested interest until more than 21 years 
after the death of the last to die of A and all of his children who 
were living at T's death. Since the class gift is regarded as in-
separable it is said to fail entirely; it is not even good as to those 
children of A who were living when the testator died and who 
had to reach the specified age, if at all, within their own life-
times. 
Proponents of reform urge that this application of the rule 
is based on historical error, that no sensible explanation has ever 
been offered in support of it, and that it is especially illogical 
since most testators would prefer that their bounty should be 
bestowed upon some members of a class than to have their at-
tempted gift fail altogether.84 Thus, it is said, it would be better 
82 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.26; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §497; GRAY, §373; 
MORRIS AND !.EACH, 95-96; SIMES AND SMITH, §1265. 
83 This is in substance Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 'Eng. Rep. 979 (1817). 
Si 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.26; Law Reform Committee Report 14, 31; 
Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1329 at 
1336-1338, 1352-1353 (1938); MORRIS AND !.EACH, 118-125. 
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in the example given to split the class and to allow the children 
of A who were living at the testator's death to take to the exclu-
sion of any born thereafter. When the rule of destructibility\ of 
contingent remainders prevailed, remaindermen who answered 
the description of takers at the ending of the supporting estate 
took to the exclusion of other previously potential takers.85 Like-
wise courts have not invalidated class gifts in their entirety merely 
because the rules concerning the closing of classes often arbitrarily 
exclude potential takers as objects of a class gift.86 Why should the 
rule against perpetuities cause such devastation when other equal- · 
ly important rules have not produced like results in like situations? 
5. In Its Non-Application to Possibilities of Reverter, Rights 
of Entry and Resulting Trusts. It is elementary learning that 
where, by the use of language of limitation, a determinable fee is 
created, a possibility of reverter remains in the maker of the 
gift. So, if property is given to a church "so long as it shall be 
used for church purposes," the church has a determinable fee 
and the donor has a possibility of reverter.87 If the property ceases 
to be used for church purposes, the fee automatically reverts to 
the donor or his successors. When language of condition, as 
distinguished from language of limitation, is employed, the fee 
is not a determinable one, but is called a fee subject to a con-
dition subsequent and the maker of the gift has a right of entry. 
Thus, if the gift supposed were altered to read to the church in 
fee simple, "but if the property shall cease to be used for church 
purposes the grantor may re-enter the property," the church has 
a fee subject to a condition subsequent and the donor has a right 
of entry.88 If the property ceases to be used for church purposes 
the fee does not automatically revert to the donor or his succes-
sors, but, upon re-entry or the performance of some equivalent act, 
he or they get the fee back. A resulting trust, which might often 
85 Abbiss v. Burney, 17 Ch. Div. 211 at 229-230 (1881): "According to my experience 
it has always been assumed, without argument, that where the fee is vested in trustees 
upon trust for a man for life, and after his death upon trust for such of his children 
as .•. shall attain twenty-one, . . . and at the death of the tenant for life there are 
some children adult and some minors, the minors, if they live to attain twenty-one, will 
take along with the others; but if equity had followed the law, then, inasmuch as there 
were persons capable of taking at the death of the tenant for life, namely, the adult 
children, they would have taken to the exclusion of the children who were minors, 
as was the case where the limitations were legal." Per Jessel, -M.R. 
86 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§22.39-22.45; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§236-244; MOR· 
RIS AND LEACH, 103-118; SIMES AND SMITH, §§634-648. 
87 North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (1908); First Universalist Society v. 
Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892). 
88 SIMES AND SMITH, §242. 
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be more accurately denominated a "possibility of a resulting 
trust," is the residual interest in the maker of a gift or his suc-
cessors which remains if property is trusteed and the trust is or 
becomes invalid or incapable of accomplishment. For instance, if 
property is given to trustees for a particular charitable purpose 
and if that purpose fails, the judicial cy pres power cannot be in-
voked to apply the property to another and like charitable objec-
tive and the trustees will hold the property on a resulting trust for 
the benefit of the donor or his successors.89 This type of interest 
may well be analogized to a possibility of reverter and indeed 
might be called an "equitable possibility of reverter" but for the 
fact that it does not seem to be dependent for its existence on the 
express use of language of limitation. 
That the future interests described in the preceding paragraph 
are contingent cannot be doubted despite the fact that it has been 
thought at least arguable that the possibility of reverter and the 
possibility of a resulting trust can be regarded as vested.90 How-
ever, in America, to the extent that the matter has been judicially 
determined, all three interests are said to fall outside of the ambit 
of the rule against perpetuities.91 In England the rule seems to 
apply to rights of entry92 and perhaps to possibilities of reverter,93 
but not to resulting trusts.94 Proponents of reform have urged 
that the American view exempting possibilities of reverter and 
rights of entry (except as incident to leases and mortgages) cannot 
be justified, 95 for interests of this kind may and do operate to clog 
real estate titles for long periods of time and with unwonted 
frequency. Some have thought that these interests should be made 
subject to time limitations even stricter than those prescribed 
89 4 Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §413 (1956). 
90 Possibilities of Reverter: ". • • [I]t could be argued that . • • possibilities of 
reverter are vested interests, and vested interests as such should not be subject to the 
rule .•• .'' SIMES AND SMITH, §1239, p. 147. Resulting Trusts: "[The] •.• resulting trust 
is a vested interest, and therefore is not obnoxious to the Rule against Perpetuities.'' 
GRAY, §603.9. 
916 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§493-494; GRAY, 
§§304-310, 313, 327.1; MORRIS AND LEACH, 205-206; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1238-1240. 
92 MORRIS AND LEACH, 205. 
93 Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 S.J. 213 (1944). "However, this ••• has 
been criticised, and cannot be said to have settled the point beyond question ••• until 
some litigant carries the matter to the Court of Appeal." Law Reform Committee 
Report 20. 
94 GRAY, §603.9; Law Reform Committee Report 21. 
95 Law Reform Committee Report 20-21; Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending 
the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 at 739-745 (1952); MORRIS AND LEACH, 
207-211; SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 70-71, 79-80 (1955). 
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by the rule against perpetuities96 and it has also been urged that 
possibilities of resulting trusts should certainly be subject to the 
rule itself. 97 
6. In Its Application to Options and Administrative Powers. In 
England the rule against perpetuities is said to be applicable to 
options in gross98 and even to options appendant to long term 
leases.99 Specific performance will not be decreed against one other 
than the optionee who has purchased from the optionor, but if the 
optionor has not parted with the property subject to the option 
the optionee may have specific performance.100 And even where 
specific performance will not be granted the optionee may have an 
action in damages against the optionor .101 In America the weight 
of authority seems to be that options in gross are subject to the 
rule102 and that the optionee may not recover damages against the 
optionor.103 Options appendant to long term leases are not thought 
to be subject to the rule in this country.104 
Gray thought that all options should be subject to the rule,105 
as indeed they ought logically to be if the rule is concerned solely 
with remoteness of vesting.106 Professor Leach would exempt all 
options from the sphere of the rule's operation107 whereas others 
would restrict options in gross at least to some degree and would 
approve the American view that options appendant to long 
term leases ought not to be fettered by arbitrary time limits.108 
96 See, e.g., the Illinois so-called "Reverter Act" [Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §§37b-37h] 
limiting the duration of these interests to 50 years. Til.is statute is discussed in CAREY 
AND SCHUYLER (Supp. 1954), §§50-55. It was held constitutional in Trustees of Schools v. 
Batdorf, 6 Ill. (2d) 486, 130 N.E. (2d) Ill (1955). For statutes of like import, see 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62, p. 158, n. 18. A 30-year period is there recommended. 
Id. at 157. 
97 Law Reform Committee Report 21, 32. 
98 London & South Western Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562 (1882). 
99 Woodall v. Clifton, [1905] 2 Ch. 257. 
100 Hutton v. Watling, [1948] Ch. 26, affd. on other grounds, [1948] Ch. 398, and 
criticized in Walford, "Options of Purchase and Perpetuities," 12 CoNv. 258 (1948). 
101 Wonhing Corporation v. Heather, [1906] 2 Ch. 532. 
102 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56; GRAY, §§330.l; SIMES AND SMITH, §1244. 
103 Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920). 
Other cases are cited in SIMES AND SMITH, §1244, p. 161, n. 38. 
104 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.57; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §492; SIMES AND 
SMITH, §1244, P- 162. 
105 GRAY, §§330-330.3. 
100 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the .Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. 
L. REv. 721 at 736-737 (1952). 
107 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: •Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. 
L. REv. 721 at 737, 748 (1952); "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. 
L. REV. 1349 at 1355 (1954); "Perpetuities ,Reform by Legislation," 70 L. Q. REv. 478 at 
490 (1954). 
108 Law Reform Committee Report 18-20, 32. 
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Since options to purchase are commercial devices it seems obvious 
that they should not be subjected to a rule designed in the begin-
ning to control family settlements. And certainly there is little 
logic to the English view that specific performance may be awarded 
in favor of the original optionor and that he may be subject to 
damages if he has brea.ched the option by putting the property 
subject to it beyond his control. On the premise that the option 
is bad, indirect enforcement should be just as objectionable as 
the direct sanction of specific performance. 
Another aspect of the rule which is of greater concern to the 
English bar than it is to American conveyancers is the application 
of the rule to administrative powers commonly conferred upon 
trustees, e.g., powers to sell, lease, mortgage, to appoint succes-
sor trustees or to invest and reinvest. Such powers, though ex-
ercisable beyond the period of the rule, have not generally been 
held invalid in this country, 109 but they are probably all subject 
to the rule in England.110 Since the matter is undecided in many 
American states and since Gray espoused the English view111 the 
matter may not be free from doubt in those American jurisdic-
tions where no authoritative decision has been rendered. Pro-
ponents of reform argue that administrative powers conferred 
upon trustees should not be subject to the rule since for the most 
part they further the very purpose which the rule itself was de-
signed to promote, i.e., the fluidity of property.112 Hence the inser-
tion of such powers in trust conveyances should be encouraged 
and it should be made clear that they are exempt from the rule. 
It should be observed that administrative powers are in this regard 
to be distinguished from powers of appointment, of which a power 
given a trustee to allocate beneficial interests in income or corpus 
is a species, and which, if not personal to the trustee, may be exer-
cised beyond the period of the rule if the trust may last longer 
than that period. It may also be observed that if a trust cannot 
last longer than lives in being and 21 years, no administrative or 
other power granted the trustee could be exercisable beyond the 
period of the rule.113 
109 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.63; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §484; SIMES AND 
SMITH, §1277. 
110 MORRIS AND LEACH, 228-229. 
111 GRAY, §§488-489. 
112 Leach, "Powers of Sale in Trustees and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 47 HARv. 
L. REv. 948 (1934). And see the authorities, in agreement, note 109 supra. 
113 SIMES AND SMITH, §1391, p. 240, suggest that the rule should be that, "A private 
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7. In Wholly Invalidating Interests Which Transgress It. 
When property is given by will in trust to pay the income to A 
for life and after his death to deliver the corpus of the trust to the 
first son of A who shall reach 25, the gift over is too remote. If 
there is a testamentary gift in trust to pay the income to the testa-
tor's children during their lives and upon their respective deaths 
to pay over the corpus to such of their respective children as reach 
25, the posterior gifts are equally bad. In each instance the dispo-
sition of the corpus of the trust is altogether void and the princi-
pal of the fund becomes intestate property even if the equitable 
life estates are allowed to stand. If, in the second supposed case, 
it is further assumed that the intestacy of the ulterior gifts results 
in the entire beneficial interest in the trust property passing to the 
equitable life tenants as heirs of the testator, some courts would 
say that the whole trust scheme should fail and that the testator's 
children should be allowed to take outright by intestacy.114 So, too, 
where one-third of an estate was left to a daughter in fee and the 
other two-thirds were left in invalid trusts for the testator's two 
sons, all of the dispositions were held to fail entirely.115 In the first 
instance, in the absence of spendthrift or other protective provi-
sions, it seems senseless that the equitable life estates should be 
sustained when the equitable fee is at the command of the equi-
table life tenants; in the second instance, the validation of the 
equitable life estate and the invalidation of the remote limitations 
following it would result in one of the testator's children ulti-
mately acquiring five-ninths of the testator's property despite a 
reasonably clear intention that there should be equality of distri-
bution between the family of the first child and those of the 
other two. The conclusion that the entire disposition should in 
each case fail is a manifestation of what has been called the doc-
trine of "infectious invalidity,"116 i.e., the view that where invalid 
posterior gifts are inseparably interwoven with those which are 
anterior to them the entire disposition will fail. Whether or not 
this result will ensue is said to depend upon the intangible of 
trust cannot be made indestructible, by its terms, for a longer period than a life or 
lives in being and twenty-one years beyond." See also -MORRIS AND LEACH, 311-316. 
114 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.48-24.52; CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §§180-181; 
GRAY, §§247-249.9; MORRIS AND LEACH, 162-165; SIMES AND SMITH, §§1262-1264. 
115 In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938), involving the former 
Michigan statutory rule, but applicable nevertheless on the point of inseparability. 
116 So denominated in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.48. 
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what the testator would have wanted had he kno1m that he could 
not do part of what he was trying to do.117 
It will be noted that in the illustrations set forth in the pre-
ceding paragraph the invalidity of the bad gifts was the result of 
the contingency that the taker or takers should attain the age of 
25. Gifts contingent upon another person's dying under an age in 
excess of 21 may be equally offensive to the rule. So if property 
is given to A for life, remainder to his first born daughter, and if 
such daughter shall die under 25 leaving children surviving her, 
then to such of the daughter's children as survive her, the gift to 
A's grandchildren is bad unless at the time it becomes effective A 
has a daughter in being. If not, the first born daughter of A will 
probably take an indefeasibly vested interest as soon as she is 
born118 and even if she has a child and dies, let us say at 20, leav-
ing that child surviving her, the child will not take under the 
instrument of gift though of course he may take through his 
mother. 
Proponents of reform believe that the automatic invalidation 
of future interests, regardless of when they would in fact have 
vested, as illustrated in this subdivision, is too harsh.11° Various 
proposed remedies and combinations of remedies, subsequently 
discussed, are suggested.120 In the case of options in gross which 
might be exercised beyond the period of the rule and which are 
accordingly invalid, total invalidity is too drastic a penalty. If 
these are to be subject to time a limitation such as 21, 30 or 50 
years, n0 attempt to exceed such limitation should wholly invali-
date them;121 they should, as in the case of invalid accumulations, 
be "void only as to the excess."122 
8. In Its Purported Concern With Remoteness of Vesting 
Alone. In the third edition of his treatise Gray recognized that vest-
ed future interests are often as capable of impairing the fluidity of 
property as contingent interests and that the alienability of vested 
interests "is not a sufficient ground for excluding them from the 
117 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §181. 
118 Where a gift over is invalid the prior gift usually remains absolute according 
to the weight of American authority. CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §176; id., Supp. 1954, §176; 
SIMES AND SMITH, §§828, 830. 
119 See the texts and articles cited note 72 supra. And see SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND 
THE DEAD HAND 66-67, 74-79 (1955). 
120 See "Reforms Which Have Been Suggested," p. 709 infra. 
121 GRAY, §330.3, pp. 367-368, n. 2; Law Reform Committee Report 19-20. 
122 l JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 395-396 (1951); SIMES AND SMITH, §468. 
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the operation of the Rule."123 "It seems," he said, "that in the ideal 
system of law ... no interests which did not vest in possession with-
in the all~tted period of time be allowed. They are within the 
practical reason of a Rule against Remoteness."124 Professor Carey 
and the writer, some sixteen years ago, expressed the view that, 
"No concept of vesting or contingency or other abstraction has any 
place in the solution of perpetuity questions."125 More recently, 
Professor Simes, though not without reservation, suggested that 
those who would reform the rule should give careful thought to 
eliminating from it the concept of vesting and to requiring tliat 
most future interests should become possessory within the limits 
of time.126 
The reasons (which will of course be amplified later) for these 
misgivings concerning the abstraction of vesting as the sacred em-
blem of the validity of a future interest may be summarized as 
follows: (1) Many vested future interests impair the fluidity of 
property to just as great a degree as do their contingent brethren. 
(2) The concept of vesting is a feudal concept which arose in con-
nection with the law of remainders and it is consequently difficult 
if not impossible to apply it sensibly in testing the validity of 
modem future interests which are for the most part executory 
interests or the equivalent thereof. (3) Highly technical, and for 
the most part illogical, rules of construction were developed in 
furtherance of the rule of early vesting, which in tum was orig-
inally developed to mitigate the harshness of the rule of destruct-
ibility of contingent remainders.127 Without regard for their 
original objective, these rules are invoked to determine whether 
or not, for purposes of the rule against perpetuities, future in-
terests are vested. Confusion has been the result. (4) This con-
fusion has created a great area of unjustifiable uncertainty in the 
solution of perpetuity problems. And although the concept of 
vesting has the one advantage of injecting flexibility into an area 
of the law where unjustly harsh results might flow from a com-
pletely rigid rule against perpetuities, there ought to be a less 
abstruse and more logical way of maintaining an adequate degree 
of flexibility. 
123 GRAY, §972. 
124 Ibid. Italics supplied. 
125 CAREY AND SCHUYLER, §474, p. 586. 
126 Sn,rns, Ptrauc PouCY AND THE DEAD HAND 67-68, 80-82 (1955). 
127 Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting," 
46 !LI.. L. REv. 407 at 408-412 (1951). 
• 
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B. Reforms Which Have Been Suggested 
I. Altering the Period of the Rule. It has been seen that five 
proposals have been made with respect to the period of the rule: 
(I) that there should be some restriction on the number of 
measuring lives which may be used; (2) that a period in gross 
should be added as an alternative to lives in being and 21 years; 
(3) that the 21-year period in gross be extended; (4) that pos-
sibilities of reverter and rights of entry should be subject to tem-
poral restrictions; and (5) that the same approach should be 
applied to options in gross. 
Dr. Morris and Professor Leach criticize the use of extraneous 
lives as a measure of validity. They say that so many may be used 
as to make "difficult and expensive ... out of all proportion to the 
advantages to anyone of thus extending the period of perpetuities" 
the tracing of the lives and determining the deaths of the persons 
whose lives are chosen.128 They admit' that, "Any attempt to re-
strict the number of permitted lives by statute would involve 
formidable difficulties of definition," but they say that "the mag-
nitude of the task which would confront the parliamentary drafts-
man is no reason for not attempting it."129 The report of the 
English Law Reform Committee comments that, "However de-
sirable such proposals may be in theory, in the end they founder 
on the difficulty of evolving a definition which, without being 
too complex to be practicable, succeeds in drawing the line in 
approximately the right place."130 There might, of course, be some 
sense in insisting that lives relevant to the dispositions in the 
instrument of gift should be used. But that would invite the 
making of illusory gifts, and the exclusion of beneficiaries of 
these as lives in being would involve all of the problems which 
used to be involved in determining when an appointment under 
a power was illusory.131 In short, the position of the British Law 
Reform Commission is persuasive. However, if no one who was 
not a beneficiary of the instrument of gift could be a "life in be-
ing," much of the rule's mathematical complexity would be 
eliminated. 
As a means of diminishing the attractiveness to draftsmen of 
selecting numerous lives as measuring lives, the British Law Re-
128 MORRIS AND LEACH, 66. 
120 Id. at 67. 
130 Law Reform Committee Report 7. 
131 Cases concerning the doctrine of illusory appointments (which is not generally 
followed in this country) are collected in 100 A.L.R. 343 (1936). The doctrine was abolished 
in England by statute. 11 Geo. 4 and I Wm. 4, c. 46 (1830). · 
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form Committee has proposed that an 80-year period in gross 
might be desirable.132 This period would be available as an alter-
native to lives in being and 21 years, but, once selected, it would 
apparently be exclusive. It would also be tied in with the notion, 
discussed in the next subdivision, that the validity of future inter-
ests should depend upon whether they in fact vest within the 
limits of time, not upon whether they might not have-the prin-
ciple denominated "wait and see." Such a reform would have 
more appeal to the British bar than in this country because of 
the fashion in England of employing so-called "royal lives clauses" 
as a means of comprehending a maximum number of measuring 
lives.133 In this country the equivalent of such clauses is seldom 
used as a technique of draftsmanship and lives in being hence do 
not as often become so hard to determine and measure. It must 
be admitted, however, that a fixed period in gross, which might 
be available as a concurrent instead of an exclusive alternative, 
has about it a fascination founded in simplicity. 
The third suggestion concerning the period of the rule, i.e., 
lengthening the 21-year period in gross, is also not without appeal 
if one accepts the supposition that the shortness of the period is 
likely to preclude the withholding of capital from the grand-
children of the maker of a gift beyond their minorities.134 There 
are, however, two basic fallacies in this supposition. First, a testa-
tor who provides for distribution of his estate among his grand-
children when they reach 35 or 40 or upon the expiration of a 
period of 21 years from the death of the last to die of all of the 
beneficiaries of his will living at his death, whichever event occurs 
first, will almost always succeed in keeping funds out of the hands 
of his grandchildren before they reach the age specified. Only if the 
testator specifies an advanced age of distribution, say 50 or 60, or 
if he is young and has no grandchildren living at his death, is 
it likely that relevant lives in being at his death plus 21 years will 
expire while the grandchildren are younger than the age which 
is specified as that at which distribution is to be made to them. 
Second, if the rule is truly concerned with remoteness of vesting 
alone, distribution from grandchildren can be theoretically with-
held from them until they reach any age, provided of course that 
the draftsman makes certain (if that is possible to do) that they 
132 Law Reform Committee Report 7, 30. 
133 Id. at 6. 
134 MORRIS AND LEACH, 67-68; SIMES, PUBUC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 68-69 (1955). 
1958] RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 711 
attain interests which are vested both in quality and quantity 
within the period of the rule. Despite these observations it may 
well be that the 21-year period in gross should be extended, for 
even if the rule continues to be directed at remoteness of vesting 
the extension of this period would at least facilitate the making of 
valid gifts over to the issue of grandchildren who died under an 
age of distribution in excess of 21 and this seems a reasonable 
objective. Also, should a rule directed against remoteness of pos-
session be deemed desirable, or should such a rule in fact exist in 
a rule which limits the duration of trusts to the perpetuity period, 
there would be instances ( e.g., if the maker of a dispositive in-
strument had no grandchildren in esse when the instrument took 
effect) where distribution could not be withheld after grand-
children attained 21 without resort to the doubtful expedient of 
selecting irrelevant lives as measuring lives.135 Should the 21-year 
period in gross be extended, a period of 30 years ought to be ade-
quate136 and a period of 40 years would probably be the maximum 
that ought to be adopted. 
The view that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry 
should be subject to temporal restrictions in the form of a period 
in gross appears to be sound unless one is prepared to espouse 
the more flexible view that courts should simply be given the 
power to decree such interests to be no longer valid when they 
either served no useful purpose or had ceased to do so.137 As 
already observed, all proponents of reform seem to agree that 
these interests should not be allowed to continue unfettered, 
and there seems also to be considerable agreement that alternative 
periods of validity should be allowed, i.e., some period in gross 
and also the period of the rule against perpetuities.138 Since lives 
in being almost never have anything to do with determinable fees 
or fees subject to rights of entry, it is very difficult indeed to see 
why the common law perpetuity period should be adopted, even 
as an alternative, to control the duration of possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry. If they are to be subject to restrictions 
135 Cf. Law Reform Committee Report 6-7. 
136 Cf. Wis Stat. (1955) §230.15. 
137 "A more sensitive treatment of the problem, perhaps ·by way of conferring equi-
table jurisdiction to extinguish such interests when they have ceased to serve any useful 
purpose, might be thought preferable." Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. (2d) 486 
at 492-493, 130 N.E. (2d) Ill at 115 (1955) (per Schaefer, J.). See also CAREY AND SCHUYLER, 
(Supp. 1954) §55. 
138 Law Reform Committee Report 20, 32; MORRIS AND LEACH, 211; SIMES, PUBLIC 
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 76-77 (1955). 
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in time, then they should become void after the expiration of 
a fixed period of time. The same should be true of attempted 
executory gifts over following determinable fees and fees subject 
to conditions subsequent, except in the case of an executory gift 
over which is incident to a family settlement. For example, in the 
case of a gift to A for life, remainder to his first born son, but 
if the latter dies without issue then over, the period of the com-
mon law rule (or any modification of it) should apply. The fore-
going discussion is of course not pertinent to possibilities of 
reverter and rights of entry incident to commercial transactions 
(e.g., a lease or a mortgage) which should not be fettered in any 
way by time restrictions. 
The last suggestion for reforming the period of the rule-
that a period in gross should apply to options in gross-is similar 
to the view urged in the preceding paragraph. Since options are 
commercial devices they cannot sensibly be subjected to time 
restrictions measured by lives in being any more than possibilities 
of reverter and rights of entry. Here again it seems clear that if a 
time restriction is adopted, some period of validity should be 
selected and that options in gross should be valid for that period 
and thereafter become ineffective. In other words, as in the case· 
of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, if too long a time 
were specified in the instrument creating the option, the option 
should not be invalid from its inception but void only as to the 
excess. 
2. The Principle Should Be "Wait and See." From what has 
been said it is apparent that the requirement of absolute certainty 
of vesting and the total invalidation of offensive interests have 
been major objects of criticism of the rule. Several cures have 
been advanced. The most popular is the so-called "wait and see" 
principle.139 Under this principle, the validity of future interests 
would not be determined at the date of their creation; one would 
wait to see whether any future interests which might have vio-
lated the rule did or would in fact violate it. As will appear, 
advocates of "wait and see" do not all agree how long the waiting 
period should be. The proposal, however, will be better under-
139 The principle of "wait and see" is approved in .the articles, notes and texts 
cited note 72 supra. It is criticized in: Phipps, "The Pennsylvania Experiment in Per-
petuities," 23 TEMP. L. Q. 20 (1949); comment, 48 MICH. L. REv. 1158 (1950); note, 26 
TEMP. L. Q. 148 (1952); Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed," 52 MICH. L. 
REv. 179 (1953); Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 707 at 
726-728, 732-733 (1955); SIMES, PUBUC Poucy AND THE DEAD HAND 72-73 (1955). 
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stood by referring back to some of the examples of invalid inter-
ests which have already been given. Testamentary gifts are as-
sumed in each instance. 
I. Gift in trust to pay income to A for life, and upon his 
death to distribute the corpus to the eldest son of A, living 
at his death, who becomes a college graduate.140 If you waited 
until A died and you saw that he had a son who was a college 
graduate, the gift over would be valid. 
2. Gift to A for life, remainder to his widow for life, re-
mainder to such of A's children as are living at the widow's 
death.141 If you waited until A died and you saw that his 
widow was a woman who had been born at the testator's 
death, the gift over would be valid. 
3. Gift to A for life, remainder to such of his children as 
attain 25.142 If you waited until A died and you saw that 
he had at that time no child, born after the testator's death, 
who at A's death was under four years old, the gift over 
would be valid. 
A serious question arising in connection with the principle of 
"wait and see" is how long do you wait to see? Suppose in ex-
ample I that A had no son living at his death who had graduated 
from college, but he did have a son alive who was two years old. 
Would you say that since the rule was not satisfied at A's death 
the ultimate gift was bad? Or would you wait another 21 years, 
i.e., until the period of the rule expired, to see whether A's son 
did in fact graduate from college within the limits of time? 
Suppose in example 2 that the widow of A turns out to be a 
woman who was not living at the testator's death. Do you hold 
the gift over bad at A's death? Or do you wait for 21 years to 
see if the widow lives that long? Suppose in example 3 that A 
has children alive at his death but some of them are not four 
years old. Do you say that none can take? Or do you wait and see 
whether the children of A who were under four when A died 
themselves die before another 21 years passes? Or do you split 
the class at A's death and say that his children who were four 
years old or more at A's death may take to the exclusion of the 
others? 
Advocates of the "wait and see" principle have given different 
answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraph. In 
140 l'. 697 supra. 
Hl Pp. 697-698 supra. 
142 P. 701 supra. 
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Pennsylvania the 1947 modification of the rule against perpe-
tuities provides that, "Upon the expiration of the period allowed 
by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by 
actual rather than possible events, any interest not then vested 
and any interest in members of a class the membership of which 
is then subject to increase shall be void."143 Apparently you wait 
as long as the law allows and you see what the situation is then. 
In Massachusetts, the 1954 modification of the rule provides 
that the validity of a future interest limited to take effect at or 
after the termination of one or more life estates or lives in being 
"shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the termina-
tion of such one or more life estates or lives." A life estate is 
defined to include "an interest which must terminate not later 
than the death of one or more persons" even though it may 
terminate at an earlier time.144 This statute, applying as it does 
only where antecedent estates precede the future interests 
affected, is obviously narrower in scope than the Pennsylvania 
statute. Also, the period during which you "wait" is not the 
whole period of the rule but only until the ending of the preced-
ing estate. Thus the Massachusetts statute would, in each of the 
three foregoing examples, allow you to "wait" until A's qeath 
and then "see"; in Pennsylvania you would presumably "wait" 
the longer periods suggested in the preceding paragraph. The 
English Law Reform Commission suggests what may be a middle 
ground, i.e., that you "wait" until you are able to "see" either 
that a questionable limitation could never vest within the period 
of the rule or until events showed that it could never vest out-
side the period.145 The Pennsylvania statute may mean the same 
thing but it does not expressly say so. 
The Pennsylvania "wait and see" doctrine gives rise to great 
and admitted difficulties in connection with the determination 
of who are to be counted as measuring lives.146 These can, as has 
been suggested, 147 be solved if the courts construe the statute as 
148 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.4. 
144 Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 184A, §1. 
145 Law Reform Committee Report 10-11. . 
146 Comments, 97 UNIV. PAL. REv. 263 at 267-268 (1948); 48 MICH. L. REv. 1158 at 
1166-1169 (1950); Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 ,MICH. L. REv. 
179 at 186-188 (1953); Cohan, "The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-
New Kernels from Old Nutshells," 28 TEMP. L. Q. 321 at 330-336 (1955); MORRIS AND 
LEACH, 86-88. 
147 Cohan, "The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels from 
Old Nutshells," 28 TEMP. L. Q. 321 at 336 (1955). 
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contemplating the same measuring lives as would be used in the 
application of the common law rule, excepting only that actual 
rather than possible events would be considered. But even such 
an interpretation will require considerable litigationu8-a fact 
which hardly recommends adoption of such a statute as a means 
of simplifying a complicated rule of property. Moreover, waiting 
out the entire period of the rule, or even until the interests in 
question must or cannot vest within that period would, in the 
case of non-trust dispositions, render many titles unmarketable 
for a far longer time than would be the case today. For instance, 
in examples 1 and 2 above, one would know at once under exist-
ing law that the future interests were invalid, whereas under the 
Pennsylvania statute and the English proposal it would be neces-
sary in example 1 to wait and see if A's son graduated from col-
lege or died within 21 years from the date of A's death, and in 
example 2 to wait and see whether A's widow (if she were unborn 
at the testator's death) died within 21 years after A's death. A 
similar waiting period could of course be required by the instru-
ment of gift, thus producing like results in terms of marketability, 
but this fact is not an answer to Professor Simes' telling com-
ment that, "to tie up property for the period of the rule, and 
then eventually to prohibit a testator from doing what he wishes 
with his own property after all, would seem to be backed by 
no public policy whatsoever."H9 An instrument of gift which by 
its terms ties up property for the maximum period allowed by 
the law and no longer is not open to this objection because in 
such a case one will know from the beginning that the future 
interests are valid. 
The Massachusetts statute to some extent meets the problems 
created by the Pennsylvania statute, because in Massachusetts 
validity will be passed upon only when antecedent life estates or 
their equivalent terminate.1150 These life estates will undoubtedly 
be valid because under Massachusetts law the vice of remoteness 
HS MoRRis AND LEACH, 88: "In most of the cases that will actually arise; the Pennsyl-
vania statute will no doubt be easily workable. But it will unquestionably require a 
substantial amount of litigation to clarify its application. Such litigation will take time 
and meanwhile the exact state of the law will be in doubt .••• " Italics supplied. 
Hll Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 MICH. L. REv. 179 at 190 
(1953). 
llSO The writer accepts Professor Leach's statement as authority for the statement 
in the text. Leach, "An Act Modifying and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities," 
39 MASS. L. Q. (No. 3) 15 at 21 (1954). " ••• [I]t is standard practice for courts to refuse 
to pass upon the validity of the remainder until ••• [the anterior estates have ended]." 
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inherent in future interests apparently does not affect the validity 
of prior interests.151 Therefore the property is neither tied up 
nor is a determination of validity deferred for longer than was 
the case under the common law rule. But in a jurisdiction where 
the doctrine of "infectious invalidity" prevails, a statute ,would 
be an anomaly which would prevent a determination of the in-
validity of future interests until the ending of prior estates which 
might themselves be invalid if the future interests turned out, 
upon a "wait and see" basis, to be too remote. And even in a 
jurisdiction where the doctrine of infectious invalidity is not 
-recognized there may still be a good deal of inconvenience attend-
ant upon waiting until all prior estates are ended for an adjudica-
tion of the status of future interests. The English Law Reform 
Committee recognizes this and would apparently allow applica-
tions for the determination of the validity of future interests to be 
made at any time; but the court could only make a final declara-
tion with respect to interests which events, at the time of applica-
tion, had shown to be certain to vest or incapable of vesting with-
ip. the period of the rule. Under the English proposal an abso-
lutely final adjudication could not be made until "events showed 
that the limitation could never vest within the period" or that 
"it could never vest outside the period."152 This proposal has 
the disadvantage of involving the possibility of several judicial 
interpretations as to the perpetuity aspects of the same instru-
ment, as contrasted with the once-and-for-all-time system afforded 
by the present rule and, it must be admitted, by the Massachusetts 
statute. 
It is apparent that each "wait and see" approach has its dis-
advantages. Each indubitably widens the scope of dead-hand con-
trol-perhaps, however, not to the extent of "dooming" the 
rule against perpetuities as Professor Simes has forcefully 
argued.153 But an advocate of reform who is not convinced by 
Professor Simes should nevertheless heed the other imbroglios, 
indicated above, into which the principle of "wait and see" may 
lead-particularly the tangible and intangible costs of interim 
uncertainty. 
3. Reforming Invalid Limitations. Almost seventy years ago 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Edgerly v. Barker,154' 
1516 .AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47. 
11S2 Law Reform Committee Report 11. 
111s Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 MICH. L. REv 179 (1953). 
11S4 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891). 
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without the aid of any statute, held that a gift to the testator's 
grandchildren when the youngest reached 40 should be trans-
muted into a gift to them when the youngest reached 21, thus 
saving the gift from destruction. The court said that the intent 
that the grandchildren should take was paramount to the intent 
that they should take at a particular time and that this dominant 
intent should be carried into effect cy pres. Professors Leach11515 
and Simes,1156 following an earlier suggestion of Judge Quarles,1157 
advocate widespread adoption of the New Hampshire court's 
position, through legislation where necessary,158 in order to 
mitigate the harshness of the rule against perpetuities. Presumably 
this judicial cy pres power would be extended not only to the 
reduction of age contingencies as in Edgerly v. Barker, but also 
to other alterations in gifts such as closing or splitting a class of 
beneficiaries in a manner designed to avoid offense to the rule, 
or shortening a period at the end of which a future interest 
should vest. Thus if a gift were made to all and every the great-
grandchildren of a testator when the youngest reached 21, a 
court might say that the gift should be made to read to "all and 
every my greatgrandchildren, being children of such of my grand-
children as are living at my death, when the youngest of them at-
tains 21." Or, in the case of a testamentary gift to "such of the 
children of A as attain 25," a court might either alter the age 25 to 
21 or it might close or split the class of takers, as in the preceding 
example, by adding the words "within 21 years from the death 
of the last to die of A and all of his children who are living at 
my death" after the words and figure "attain 25." Or, if property 
155 Leach: "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1329 at 1336-1338 (1938); "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of .the Innocents," 68 L. Q. 
R.Ev. 35 at 51 (1952); "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 
65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 at 735-736 (1952); "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 
67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 at 1353-1354 (1954); "Perpetuities Reform by Legislation," 70 
L. Q. R.Ev. 478 at 490, 491 (1954); "An Act Modifying and Clarifying ,the Rule Against Per-
petuities," 39 MAss. L. Q. (No. 3) 15 at 24 (1954). 
156Simes: "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?" 52 -MICH. L. REV. 179 at 
193-194 (1953); "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 728, 
733-736 (1955); PUBUC PoUCY AND THE DEAD HAND 69, 76-79 (1955). 
157 Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule 
Against Perpetuities and Trust for Accumulation," 21 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. R.Ev. 384 (1946). 
See also Looker, "Rules Against Perpetuities,'' 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 832 (1955); Bogert, 
"Public Policy and the Dead Hand: A Special ,Book Review,'' 6 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 51 at 
57 (1956). 
158 Cf. the statute recently adopted in Vermont which directs the court to reform 
any interest which would violate the rule to effectuate the intention of the creator of 
the interest. Vermont Laws (1957) No. 157. 
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were given by will to A for life, remainder for life to any widow 
of his (thus making difficult an interpretation that a widow who 
was a life in being at the time of the gift was meant), remainder 
to such of A's children as may be living at the death of the widow, 
a court might say that the gift to the widow should be made to 
read, "remainder to any widow of A's until her death or until 
the expiration of 21 years from the death of the last to die of all 
of the beneficiaries of this will who are living at my death." In 
each instance, validity would supplant invalidity. 
The difficulty with the cy pres approach is the high degree 
of uncertainty that it introduces into the effect of dispositive 
instruments. This uncertainty would probably not constitute, as 
uncertainty sometimes does, an impetus to perpetuity litigation, 
since the beneficiaries of an instrument of doubtful validity would 
almost surely resist a declaration of invalidity whether the cy pres 
power existe!I or not. However, the existence of a power to re-
write an otherwise invalid gift would involve nebulous specu-
lations into what the maker of the gift would have wanted if he 
had known that his attempted gift was bad. For instance, in the 
case of a contingent class gift payable to the children of A when 
the youngest reaches 25, would the testator prefer that the age 
contingency should be reduced to 21 or that the class should 
comprehend only children of A who were living at the testator's 
death? The answer to this question will never be definitive and is 
bound to vary from case to case. It involves, moreover, the most 
delicate and intangible aspects of the interpretative process. Nor 
is it an answer that the cy pres power works well in cases where 
gifts for general charitable purposes fail or that courts are faced 
in other cases with determining what a testator would have 
wanted under some unanticipated circumstance. In the charitable 
trust cases we accept the cy pres doctrine because we feel that a 
general charitable intent is meritorious and should be given effect 
as a matter of public policy. No public policy demands that solici-
tude for private dispositions should be carried to the point of 
injecting into perpetuity cases, which are complicated enough at 
best, the most difficult of all construction problems, i.e., that of 
deciding what a dead man would have thought had he thought 
about something that he didn't think about.1159 The average chan-
cellor is too busy to balance carefully the many factors which 
159 Schuyler, "Future Interests in Illinois: Current Maturities and Some Futures," 
50 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 457 at 538-539 (1955). 
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ought to be weighed before an answer to this troublesome in-
terpretative enigma is attempted. As a result, the solution of 
perpetuity problems is likely to become more involved if a cy pres 
solution is attempted, and fewer cases are likely to be resolved 
at a nisi prius level. The protraction and increased cost of litiga-
tion, familiar to every chancery practitioner, which would attend 
this result may well have induced proponents of reform to shun 
cy pres in connection with recent Massachusetts legislation.160 
No doubt these considerations also-prompted rejection of cy pres 
by the English Law Reform Committee with the statement, "We 
are far from convinced that the complexities inherent in such 
a vague and uncertain jurisdiction would be outweighted by any 
practical advantage."161 
That cy pres offers an impracticable solution to perpetuity 
problems is not to say that invalid limitations cannot be remolded 
satisfactorily and with more certainty. Since 1925, section 163 
of the English Law of Property Act162 has provided in substance 
that if an interest would violate the rule because it is contingent 
upon attainment or failure to attain an age in excess of 21, the age 
of 21 shall be substituted for the age specified. This section would 
validate many of the invalid types of gifts of which examples are 
given earlier in this discussion. So, if property were given to A 
for life, remainder to such of his children as reach 25, the age 
21 would supplant the age 25. Or if the gift were to A for life, 
remainder to his first born daughter, but if such daughter shall 
die under 25 leaving children surviving her, then to such chil-
dren, a like substitution would be made. The same would be true 
of a gift to A for life, remainder to his first born son who reaches 
25. In each instance, the automatic alteration of the age contin-
gency saves an othenvise void gift. It has been said that this sec-
tion cures "the most common single cause of violations of the 
Rule" and that the absence of litigation concerning it shows that 
it has worked well.163 Gray, on the other hand, thought that the 
160 Leach, "Perpetuities Reform by Legislation," 70 L. Q. REv. 478 at 490 (1954): 
"The objection in Massachusetts [to cy pres] is a practical one: it was, in our judgment, 
just too big a step for our judges and lawyers to take .••• " Leach, "An Act Modifying 
and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities," 39 MASS. L. Q. (No. 3) 15 at 24 (1954): 
" •.. [I]t is considered preferable at this time to dispose of the great majority of cases 
by a simple statute [automatically reducing age contingencies] unlikely to cause litigation 
than to try to remedy all cases by a less specific statute [providing for cy pres]." 
161 Law Reform Committee Report 16. 
102 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §163 (1925). 
163 MORRIS AND LEACH, 54. 
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section would take property from persons whom the testator 
meant to have it and transfer it to others.164 But surely that is 
less true of section 163 than it is of the rule itself, and section 163 
has the distinct merit of ameliorating the harshness of the rule 
without injecting the vagueness and uncertainty of~ the cy pres 
doctrine. A more cogent criticism may be that the effect of the 
section is to put capital into the hands of beneficiaries before 
their training has readied them to receive it.165 Again, however, 
it seems probable that the makers of most gifts would rather have 
their beneficiaries take at too early an age than not take at all. 
However, five members of the English Law Reform Committee 
would not apply section 163 or its equivalent until it was deter-
mined whether the questionable limitations did in fact vest 
within the period of the rule.166 In other words, they would first 
apply the principle of "wait and see." A majority of the English 
Law Reform Committee did not subscribe to this view; they 
would apply section 163 first and then, if necessary, "wait and 
see."161 
The English Law Reform Committee suggests still a further 
means of reforming class gifts to comply with the rule. If, after 
applying section 163, and after having "waited and seen," some 
of the members of a class did not attain vested interests within 
· the limits of time, the committee suggests that those members 
of the class who did attain such interests in timely fashion should 
be allowed to take.168 This of course involves a rejection of the 
rule of Leake v. Robinson169 and an acceptance of Professor 
Leach's theory that class gifts should not be regarded as indivisible 
for purposes of the rule. A case could arise if a testator made a 
gift to such of A's grandchildren as attain 25. The gift is invalid 
unless at the testator's death A and his children are dead, or un-
less a grandchild has attained 25 thus closing the class. Testing 
the effect of section 163, the gift is still too remote because A 
may have children after the testator dies and they may have chil-
dren who may reach 21 (substituted for 25) and they may not 
do so until more than 21 years after the death of A and all of 
164 GRAY, §872. 
165 Law Reform Committee Report (dissenting note by Mr. Burrows and Dr. Morris 
in which three other members of the committee of 12 concurred) 34. 
166Id. at 34-35. 
167 Law Reform Committee Report 15. 
168 Id. at 14, 15. 
169 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817). 
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his children and grandchildren who were alive when the testator 
died. Presumably, therefore, section 163 will not apply at all 
since its application is limited to cases where it would save the 
gift from destruction. We would therefore "wait and see" wheth-
er all of A's grandchildren will take or whether the class must 
be split. Presumably we shall wait until the death of A and all 
of his children and grandchildren who were living at the testator's 
death or until A's oldest grandchild reaches 25, whichever 
event occurs first, since the class would be closed at all events 
upon the happening of the latter event. If the death of all rele-
vant lives in being is the event which marks the end of the "wait 
and see" period, all of A's grandchildren who are four years old 
or more at that time, even children of children of A who were 
not living at the testator's death, will be able to share in the gift 
because all of such grandchildren must reach 25 or die thereunder 
within 21 years from the expiration of the relevant lives. On the 
other hand, splitting the class without "waiting and seeing" would 
make the gift good only as to grandchildren of A who were alive 
at the testator's death. Obviously, the effect of the "wait and see" 
principle in terms of the number of grandchildren who would 
share in the gift would depend entirely on how many grandchil-
dren were born during the "wait and see" period. Since this 
would vary so much in individual situations, it is by no means 
easy to appraise the benefit of "waiting and seeing" in terms of 
its effect upon what testators might generally prefer. The diffi-
culties of applying the principle of "wait and see" in other situa-
tions have already been discussed; there are no like problems 
involved in confining a class, as of a testator's death, to persons 
whose interests will necessarily be irrevocably fixed within the 
period of the rule. The only real objection to splitting class gifts 
arises from the fact that it may frustrate intention to an even 
greater degree than would the intestacy which would flow from 
complete invalidity.170 Perhaps the splitting of classes in apt 
situations could be best accomplished by legislative indications 
170 Professor Leach, who argued with great force .that there was no basis for the 
English view that class gifts are indivisible, also suggested ·that, "It is a problem of 
construction, similar to that which is faced by a court when it declares one section of a 
statute unconstitutional: Is the amputated portion so vital to the body that it cannot 
survive the amputation?" Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 
HARv. L. REv. 1329 at 1338 (1938). More recently he may have partially recanted. MORRIS 
AND LEACH, 125: "These suggestions [concerning class gifts] are analogous to • . . the 
doctrine of 'Infectious Invalidity.' • • • [This] doctrine • • • has not been adopted by 
English courts, nor (in the opinion of •.• [Dr. Morris]) is it desirable that it should be." 
722 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
that instruments should be construed, where possible, so as not 
to violate the rule, 171 rather than by legislative mandates as to 
the splitting of class gifts. Unless the latter were tempered with 
a direction that courts investigate what the testator would have 
preferred under the circumstances a good many injustices might 
result. That would be very close to a mandatory cy pres approach 
with all of its inherent problems already described. 
4. Adopting Realistic Presumptions. As has been seen, the 
fantastic hypotheses of which the common law rule requires accept-
ance often cause gifts to be held to be too remote. These hypoth-
eses fall into two broad categories: (I) the assumption that the 
procreation of offspring may occur at any age; and (2) the assump-
tion that administrative contingencies, though highly unlikely 
to occur beyond the period of the rule, may in fact do so. 
As to the presumption of fertility, the English Law Reform 
Committee would eliminate it and substitute in its place a re-
buttable presumption that no woman who has attained 55 is 
capable of bearing a child and that no person under 14 is 
capable of procreating or bearing a child. In addition, the com-
mittee would permit the introduction of medical evidence to 
establish such incapacity. If subsequent events should rebut the 
presumption or confute the evidence, any decision based upon 
either would be allowed to stand. But an afterborn child who, 
according to the decision, could not have been born, would be 
able to pursue any property rights ( even to the point of follow-
ing or tracing) which it might have and which did not violate 
the rule.1.72 
To illustrate how the English Law Reform Committee pro-
posal would work, let there be supposed a gift to the grand-
children of the testator's daughter A to be divided among them 
when all and every the said grandchildren of A attain 25. At 
the testator's death A is 56 years old and has a daughter B who is 
24 years old. B has two children, C and D, six and four years old. 
Under the common law rule the gift to A's grandchildren is 
invalid. Nor will it be validated by the application of section 163 
of the Law of Property Act which, if it applied, would reduce 
l.71.SIMES, Ptrauc POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 74 (1955): " .•. [T]here should be a 
rule of construction to this effect: If there is a possibility of invalidity under the Rule, 
the court should construe .the language of the will to effectuate as nearly as possible 
what the testator would have intended at the time of his death ·had he then known 
that the application of the Rule might make all or a part of the will invalid." 
172Law Reform Committee Report 9, 31. 
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to 21 the age contingency upon which the grandchildren of A 
were to take. Section 163 is therefore inapplicable because it 
"operates on a limitation either at once or not at all .... "173 If, 
however, A can have no more grandchildren the gift to her grand-
children is good. Applying the presumption of inability to bear 
children at an age in excess of 55, we find that A can have no 
more children. Allowing and relying upon medical evidence, we 
find that B has been sterilized and can have no more children. 
The gift is saved without even "waiting and seeing." Twenty-one 
years pass and C, A's youngest grandchild, reaches 25. Distribu-
tion is made to B and C; the class may be closed because no more 
grandchildren may be born. Then, B, at the age of 45 confound-
ing her gynecologist, has another child, E. The decision that 
the gift to A's grandchildren was valid stands even though "the 
subsequent birth of a child . . . shows the evidence to be erro-
neous .... "174 But if E (the grandchild who couldn't be born) 
attains 25 within 21 years from the death of the last to die of A, 
B, C and D, E's interest will, on a "wait and see" basis, prove 
to be valid. Evidently E would be able, under the English pro-
posal, to force C and D to disgorge part of what they had re-
ceived, for E has a right to property "that in the event is not 
itself void for perpetuity," and "that right (including any right 
to follow or trace the property) is not prejudiced by the decision 
of the court."175 
The advantage of presumptions suggested by the English 
Law Reform Committee and of receiving and relying upon medi-
cal evidence as to capacity to have offspring are apparent. In 
many cases, these proposals would validate otherwise void but 
harmless future interests. Furthermore, even though the Law 
Reform Committee favors the "wait and see" approach, the 
proposals under discussion would often eliminate the necessity 
of resort to the "wait and see" principle so that the validity or 
invalidity of future interests could be determined at a much 
earlier date than would be possible on a strictly "wait and see" 
basis. However, one cannot wax enthusiastic over the suggestion 
that if events rebut the presumption of infertility or prove medi-
cal evidence to have been erroneous, an afterbom child should 
in some cases be permitted to upset distributions already made 
173 Id. at 15. 
174. Id. at 9. 
11:i Ibid. 
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with the Sanction of a judicial decree. This reinjects uncertainty 
and quite plainly could place distributees under such a decree in 
an equivocal position. 
In respect of other improbable possibilities, the so-called 
administrative contingency cases such as a gift contingent upon 
the probate of a will, the payment of debts or when an estate 
is settled, Professor Simes has suggested that there should be 
statutory directions that such conditions shall be deemed to be 
contemplated to occur within 21 years.176 The Law Reform Com-
mittee rejects this solution on the footing that "a satisfactorily 
exhaustive enumeration of . . . [traps to be excluded] would 
be difficult to devise and, however well formulated, would leave 
untouched the more general criticism that even where real as 
distinct from theoretical possibilities are concerned, it is wrong 
that the rule should invalidate gifts which in fact vest within the 
permitted period .... "177 Admitting the difficulty of composing 
an all-inclusive list of contingencies to be embraced by a statute, 
it seems likely that Professor Simes' objective could be achieved 
in part by specific- legislation and in part by the creation of a 
statutory direction that, for perpetuity purposes, there shall be 
a presumption that the maker of an instrument of gift intended 
validly to dispose of his property. Such a presumption would 
be of assistance in the administrative contingency cases and it 
ought also to aid in eliminating many of the other undesirable 
results which flow from the requirement of absolute certainty of 
vesting.178 
5. Discarding the Rule's Vest. Since the major objective of 
this article is to weigh the validity of exempting vested interests 
from the rule, the suggestion that the concept of vesting as a test 
of validity should be discarded is mentioned here only for the 
sake of completeness and will be touched upon only briefly at 
this point. Professor Simes has indicated that reversions and other 
future interests incident to long term leases and other commercial 
transactions would have to be exempt from a rule against perpe-
tuities directed at remoteness of possession.179 He seems also to 
feel that equitable interests in income should be regarded as 
possessory interests.18° Finally, he suggests that litigation over the 
176 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 77 (1955). 
177 Law Reform Committee Report 10. 
178 Cf. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 74 (1955). 
179 Id. at 81. 
1so Ibid. 
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vested or contingent character of future interests could perhaps 
more safely be eliminated by treating as contingent all future 
interests limited to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the 
ending of a life estate.181 The merit of these and other possibili-
ties can be adequately measured only after the concept of vesting 
as a whole has been considered. First it will be well to summarize 
the other suggestions for reform of the rule which have been dis-
cussed since some of these may well be interwoven with the 
possibility of removing the rule's vest. 
C. Comments Concerning the Foregoing 
As to some criticisms and proposed reforms of the common 
law rule against perpetuities there can be little disagreement. 
The period of the rule, perhaps not altogether logical, has caused 
but mild comment. Extending the 21-year period in gross to 30 
or 40 years and introducing an alternative period of 7 5 or 80 
years might be desirable, especially if the rule should be made 
applicable to remoteness of possession. Rights of entry and possi-
bilities of reverter, unless incident to long term commercial de-
vices such as leases and mortgages, ought to be made subject to 
temporal restrictions. Except in family settlements, however, a 
fixed period of time, perhaps 30 to 50 years, should apply. Result-
ing trust interests ( or possibilities thereof) should probably also 
be subject to the rule. In the case of trusts for particular charitable 
purposes, however, this would require the introduction of a 
modified executive cy pres power, for if a resulting trust could 
not take effect if a particular charity ceased to exist after the 
period of the rule expired, what would be done with the property? 
Subjecting resulting trusts, arising when the purposes of a private 
trust were no longer capable of accomplishment, to the rule would 
almost necessitate a concomitant rule that all private trusts must 
end within the period of the rule. Again, if this were not so, what 
disposition would be made of the trust property if the resulting 
trust were void? Options appendant to long-term leases and mort-
gages, being commercial devices, should be clearly exempted 
from the rule. So should administrative powers of trustees, if 
private trusts are to be allowed to last longer than the period of 
the rule. These powers further rather than defeat the rule's 
objectives. If options in gross are to be subject to temporal restric-
181 Id. at 82. 
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tion, the restriction should be a fixed period and they should 
be valid during that period. 
A large area of agreement also exists with respect to the rule's 
harshness in its requirement of absolute certainty, in its accept-
ance of fantastic hypotheses, in its application to class gifts and 
in its total invalidation of interests which transgress it. Disagree-
ment exists as to the remedy. The automatic reduction of age 
contingencies in excess of 21 years to 21, the creation of a pre-
sumption of infertility with respect to infants, aged women and 
perhaps aged men, and the opening of the door to the admission 
of medical evidence of incapacity to produce offspring would sup-
plant fantasy with logic. So would a presumption that those dis-
posing of property want to do so validly. Among other things, 
such a presumption might encourage the splitting of classes where 
this would save class gifts from the rule without injecting the 
perhaps undesirable inflexibility which the mandatory splitting 
of classes for that purpose would create. On the other hand, a 
broad grant to courts of a cy pres power to reform otherwise. void 
limitations would make for considerable uncertainty, might pro-
tract and add to the cost of perpetuity litigation, and for these 
reasons seems to the writer to be unwise. The principle of "wait 
and see" is highly controversial and although it solves some prob-
lems it certainly adds new ones. If it is to be adopted at all it 
must be in modified form. In a jurisdiction which recognizes the 
doctrine of "infectious invalidity," the "wait and see" principle 
is wholly impracticable. However, as will later be suggested in 
more detailed fashion, if some sort of a statutory "saving clause" 
could be devised so that antecedent interests would automatically 
end when the period of the rule expired, all of the· advantages of 
"wait and see" could be achieved without running afoul of the 
greatest objection to it, i.e., interim uncertainty. The difficulty 
lies in drafting a satisfactory statutory direction as to the destina-
tion of property when the period of the rule expires before the 
event upon which future interests are specified to take effect has 
occurred. This problem is especially acute in cases where the 
instrument of gift has created future interests limited to take 
effect upon alternative contingencies which, but for the proposed 
statutory "saving clause," would be too remote. 
[To be concluded.] 
